Our results suggest that the optimal configuration under lack of full information on theft level lies between the optimal configurations corresponding to the high and low theft levels.
Our results suggest that the optimal configuration under lack of full information on theft level lies between the optimal configurations corresponding to the high and low theft levels.Interestingly enough, our analysis also suggests that for certain technical (yet realistic) conditions on the ROC curve that characterizes achievable detection probability and false alarm probability configurations, the value of information about certain combination of theft levels can attain negligibly small values.Tags: High School Business Law Lesson PlansHbcu ScholarshipsDissertation CitationThesis In 2 Wochen SchreibenBrainstorms Philosophical Essays On Mind And PsychologyAssign SmartyEssay Arranged Love MarriagesCapital Market Research PapersWilliam Shakespeare EssayMs-Drg Assignment
We first consider situation in which only the first source of information incompleteness is present, i.e., the distribution utility has complete information about the actual theft level.
We present two simultaneous game models, which have same assumption about customer preferences and fraud, but differ in the way in which the distribution utility operates the IDS.
In the first model, the distribution utility probabilistically chooses to use IDS with a default (fixed) configuration.
In the second model, the distribution utility can configure/tune the IDS to achieve an optimal operating point (i.e.
One one hand, the technological innovations can potentially lead large-scale adoption of analytics driven tools for predictive maintenance and anomaly detection systems in electricity industry.
On the other hand, private profit-maximizing firms (distribution utilities) need accurate assessment of the value of these tools to justify investment in collection and processing of significant amount of data and buy/implement analytics tools that exploit this data to provide actionable information (e.g.
Our results show that for, the game with default IDS configuration, the distribution utility does not use the IDS in equilibrium if the fraction of fraudulent customers is less than a critical fraction.
Also the distribution utility realizes a positive "value of IDS" only if one or both have the following conditions hold: (a) the ratio of detection probability and false alarm probability is greater than a critical ratio, (b) the fraction of fraudulent customers is greater than the critical fraction.
combination of detection probability and false alarm rate).
Throughout, we assume that the theft level is greater than cost of attack.